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AGAINST CREATIVITY
Brian L. Frye*
ABSTRACT: According to the Supreme Court, copyright requires
both independent creation and creativity. The independent creation
requirement provides that copyright cannot protect an element of a
work of authorship that is copied from a previously existing work.
But scholars disagree about the meaning of and justification for the
creativity requirement.
The creativity requirement should be abandoned because it is
irrelevant to the scope of copyrightable subject matter and distorts
copyright doctrine by encouraging inefficient “creativity rhetoric.”
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Burk, Omri-Rachum Twaig, and the American Bar Association Intellectual Property
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The purpose of copyright is to encourage the production of
economically valuable works of authorship, not creativity.
INTRODUCTION
Originality is the essence of copyright. According to the Supreme
Court, originality requires both independent creation and some kind
of creativity.1 However, the Court has failed to provide a coherent
definition of or justification for either requirement. In particular,
many scholars have struggled with the definition and propriety of
the creativity requirement. 2 Some have tried to provide a legal
definition of creativity; 3 others have argued that creativity is an
ideological term, derived from the Romantic concept of authorship. 4
Some have argued that copyright may promote creativity by
discouraging copying; 5 others argue that creativity should be
irrelevant to copyright because it excludes factual works from
protection.6
The creativity requirement is indeed irrelevant, because it does
not actually affect the scope of copyrightable subject matter, but it
should still be explicitly abandoned because it encourages inefficient

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 830 (2010) (“But ‘creativity’ in Feist's sense gives advocates and
courts few tools for distinguishing what is, and what is not, creative.”).
3 Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 824 (1993) (“The
only logical approach to embracing Feist's creativity requirement is to fashion a legal
definition for the word ‘creativity.’”).
4 See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”,
1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991).
5 Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2015).
6 Mark K. Temin, The Irrelevance of Creativity: Feist’s Wrong Turn and the Scope of Copyright Protection for Factual Works, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 263 (2006) (“The concept of creativity should be irrelevant in determining the scope of copyright protection for factual works, which is explained by the purpose of such works: the communication of
information.”).
1
2
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“creativity rhetoric.” The purpose of copyright is to encourage the
production of economically valuable works of authorship, not
creativity. The creativity requirement encourages courts to overvalue
existing works of authorship and undervalue new works of
authorship.
I.

THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT

Scholars have advanced many different theories of copyright, 7
but the prevailing theory of copyright is the economic theory, which
holds that copyright is justified because it solves market failures in
works of authorship by making them partially excludable.
Classical economics predicts that free riding will cause market
failures in public goods. 8 In theory, government can solve market
failures in public goods by subsidizing the production of those
goods. Nevertheless, the Coase Theorem and public choice
economics both predict that the resulting transaction costs will also
cause “government failures” in public goods or market failures that
government cannot solve because it does not know which public
good to subsidize. Specifically, the Coase Theorem observes that
information costs limit government’s ability to determine which
subsidies will be efficient, 9 and public choice economics observes

See generally PETER S. MENELL, 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENERAL THEORIES,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds.
2000) (surveying theories of copyright).
8 “Market failures” are inefficiencies in the market for a good; “public goods” are
goods that are nonrival and nonexcludable; and “free riding” is the consumption of a
good without paying the marginal cost of production.
9 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141 (2014).
7
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that politics limit government’s ability to provide efficient
subsidies.10
Works of authorship are quintessential public goods because
they are perfectly nonrival and nonexcludable. Consumption of a
work of authorship does not diminish the supply of the work, and in
the absence of copyright, authors cannot limit consumption of a
published work of authorship. Accordingly, classical economics
predicts market failures in works of authorship caused by free riding.
Marginal authors will not invest in the creation of works of
authorship because they cannot recover production costs.
Of course, government can solve some of those market failures
by directly subsidizing the production of works of authorship, but
direct subsidies are vulnerable to transaction costs that will still cause
government failures. The Coase Theorem predicts that information
costs will cause government failures because the government often
has less information than market participants about the demand for
works of authorship, rendering direct subsidies inefficient. 11 Public
choice economics predicts that rent-seeking will also cause
government failures by encouraging producers to compete for
subsidies, rather than consumer demand.
Thus, the economic theory holds that copyright is justified
because it solves both market failures and government failures in
works of authorship by indirectly subsidizing their production, and
thereby reducing the transaction costs associated with direct
subsidies. Copyright indirectly subsidizes works of authorship by
making them partially excludable, enabling copyright owners to
prevent free riding. Therefore, copyright solves market failures in

See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 WESTERN
ECON. J. 224 (1967); Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64
AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974).
11 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141 (2014).
10
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works of authorship by ensuring that the authors of economically
valuable works of authorship can recover their production costs, and
copyright solves government failures in works of authorship by
ensuring that the economic risk associated with investing in the
production of works of authorship is borne by authors, rather than
the government.
However, copyright itself may impose transaction costs if
authors do not behave like rational economic actors. Many authors
systematically overvalue the works of authorship they create12 and
discount economic incentives. 13 Moreover, copyright owners may
collectively engage in rent-seeking by requesting broader copyright
protection and a longer copyright term.
Notably, the economic theory of copyright is explicitly
consequentialist, holding that copyright is justified because it
increases net economic welfare. The copyright “quid pro quo”
assumes that authors invest in the production of works of authorship
in exchange for copyright protection. In other words, the economic
theory assumes that copyright provides salient incentives for
marginal authors to invest in the creation of works of authorship. It
holds that copyright is justified because the economic cost of granting
copyright protection is smaller than the economic benefit generated
by the additional works of authorship.
But the economic theory also implies that copyright is justified if
and only if it increases net economic welfare. Thus, if copyright is
justified because it increases net economic welfare, it is not justified
when it decreases net economic welfare. Under the economic theory,
copyright increases net economic welfare by providing salient
incentives for marginal authors to invest in the production of works

See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011).
13 See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2014).
12
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of authorship. So, if and when copyright does not provide a salient
incentive to marginal authors, it is not justified. Moreover, if and
when the marginal cost of copyright protection exceeds the marginal
benefit, it is also not justified.
There are many alternative theories of copyright. Some are
consequentialist but consider non-economic welfare. Others are
deontological and consider the natural or expressive rights of
authors.14 But the Supreme Court has explicitly and repeatedly held
that the Intellectual Property Clause adopted the economic theory:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ 15
Accordingly, this Article uses the economic theory to evaluate
the justification for the “creativity” requirement. It assumes that if
copyright can increase net economic welfare by encouraging
“creativity,” then copyright should require “creativity;” but if
copyright cannot increase net economic welfare by encouraging
“creativity,” then copyright should ignore “creativity.”
II.

THE SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT

Copyright only protects original works of authorship. 16
According to the Supreme Court, “[o]riginality is a constitutional
requirement” for copyright protection. 17 As a consequence, the

See generally MENELL, supra note 7.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954)).
16 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2015).
17 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
14
15
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“originality” requirement defines the subject matter of copyright.
Oddly, however, the meaning of “originality” for copyright purposes
is unclear. Historically, originality required only independent
creation. Copyright could protect any work of authorship that was
not a copy of a previously existing work of authorship. As Justice
Holmes observed, “Others are free to copy the original. They are not
free to copy the copy.”18 But in Feist, the Supreme Court held that
originality requires not only independent creation, but also
“creativity”: “Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only
that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed
to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some
minimal degree of creativity.” 19 Unfortunately, the Court failed to
define “creativity” or meaningfully explain what it requires.
III.

FEIST V. RURAL

Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. provided telephone
service to several communities in northwest Kansas. Pursuant to
state regulation, Rural published and distributed free of charge to its
subscribers a telephone directory. Rural’s directory consisted of
“white pages” and “yellow pages.” The white pages listed all of
Rural’s subscribers in alphabetical order, along with their town of
residence and telephone number. The yellow pages listed all of
Rural’s commercial subscribers in alphabetical order by category,
accompanied by paid advertisements of varying sizes.
Feist Publications, Inc. published and distributed free of charge
regional telephone directories that consisted of white pages and
yellow pages. Feist typically licensed the relevant white pages
listings from telephone service providers and competed with them
for yellow pages advertisements. In 1978, Feist decided to publish a

18
19

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903).
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
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regional telephone directory for Northwest Kansas. The region
covered by Feist’s directory included many of Rural’s subscribers, as
well as the subscribers of ten other telephone service providers. Feist
offered to license the relevant white pages listings from the telephone
service providers, but Rural refused, so Feist copied Rural’s white
pages listing without permission.
Suspecting Feist of copying its white pages listings, Rural
inserted six fictitious listings into its 1982-1983 white pages directory.
When Feist used Rural’s directory to update its 1983 Northwest
Kansas Area-Wide Telephone Directory, it copied four of the
fictitious listings.
Rural, tipped off by the fictitious listings, sued Feist for copyright
infringement. The district court granted summary judgment to
Rural, holding that copyright does protect telephone directories, and
the circuit court affirmed. 20 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that copyright could not protect the elements of Rural’s white pages
directory copied by Feist because they lacked originality.
Specifically, the Court found that the individual listings copied by
Feist lacked originality because they were “facts” and therefore not
“independently created” by Rural; and the compilation of listings
copied by Feist lacked originality because its creation did not require
any “creativity.”21
A. ORIGINALITY
The Court began by observing that copyright can only protect
the original works of authorship: “The sine qua non of copyright is
originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be

Rural v. Feist, 663 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D. Kan. 1987), aff’d, 916 F. 2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990),
rev’d 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
21 Feist, 499 U.S. at 342..
20
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original to the author.” 22 Originality “is a constitutional
requirement,” because the Intellectual Property Clause only
authorizes Congress to grant copyright protection to original works
of authorship.23
The Court also held that copyright can only protect the original
“elements” of a work of authorship:
The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that
every element of the work may be protected. Originality
remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright
protection may extend only to those components of a work
that are original to the author.24
By implication, a “work of authorship” may—and typically
does—consist of both original elements that are protected by
copyright and unoriginal elements that are not. The Copyright Act
defines a “compilation” as “a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a
whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” 25 In other words,
the Copyright Act defines a “compilation” as a work of authorship
created by compiling unoriginal elements in an original way.
Copyright cannot protect the unoriginal elements, but can protect the
original way in which they are compiled. However, if copyright
independently protects each original element of a work, then every
“work of authorship” is effectively a “compilation” of original and

Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 346 (1991) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S.
82 (1879); and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53 (1884)).
24 Id. at 348 (emphasis in original).
25 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015).
22
23

2017]

AGAINST CREATIVITY

435

unoriginal elements, which copyright may also protect as an original
selection, ordering, or arrangement of those elements. 26
Notably, the Court’s conclusion that copyright can only protect
the original elements of a work of authorship renders the
reproduction and adaptation rights redundant. The reproduction
right gives copyright owners the exclusive right “to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords” and the adaptation
right gives copyright owners the exclusive right “to prepare
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” 27 A “derivative
work” is a work that copies one or more original elements of a
copyrighted work. 28 In other words, the adaptation right gives
copyright owners the exclusive right to reproduce the original
elements of a copyrighted work. So, if the reproduction right attaches
only to a “copyrighted work” as a whole, then it merely gives
copyright owners a subset of the rights given by the adaptation right.
Accordingly, if the reproduction right attaches to each original
element of a “copyrighted work,” then it is congruent with the
adaptation right.
In any case, the Court held that “originality” requires both
“independent creation” and some degree of “creativity”:
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that
the work was independently created by the author (as

See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Intern., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F. 2d 693 (2d. Cir. 1992). See
also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169 (2008) (“However, if a very literal approach is taken, there is likely no work of authorship that is not
a compilation under the statutory definition.”).
27 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(2) (2015).
28 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (1963) (stating “a work will be considered a derivative work only if it would be considered an infringing work if the material that it has derived from a pre-existing work had been taken without the consent
of a copyright proprietor of such pre-existing work”).
26
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opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses
at least some minimal degree of creativity.29
The Court reached the correct result under the economic theory
of copyright, because Rural did not need a copyright incentive to
produce its white pages listings. But unfortunately, it failed to
provide a coherent explanation of why either the independent
creation or creativity requirements precluded copyright protection of
the white pages listings copied by Feist.
1.

Independent Creation

First, the Court held that the individual white pages listings
lacked “originality” because they were “facts” and therefore not
“independently created” by Rural. The “independent creation”
requirement provides that copyright can only protect the elements of
a work that are not “copied” from another work. 30 In other words,
copyright can only protect the elements of a work of authorship that
were actually created by an author of that work. If an element of a
work is copied from a pre-existing work, the copyright in that
element, if any, belongs to the author of the pre-existing work.
The Court held that the independent creation requirement
precludes copyright protection of “facts,” because they are not
created by an author:
“No one may claim originality as to facts.” This is because
facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The
distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first
person to find and report a particular fact has not created the
fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence. To borrow

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (emphasis in original).
30 Id. at 345-47 (1991)
29
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from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its
“maker” or “originator.” “The discoverer merely finds and
records.”31
Accordingly, the Court held that copyright could not protect
Rural’s white pages listings, because they were “facts” that Rural
discovered and reported, but did not create. 32
[D]id Feist, by taking 1,309 names, towns, and telephone
numbers from Rural’s white pages, copy anything that was
“original” to Rural? Certainly, the raw data does not satisfy
the originality requirement. Rural may have been the first to
discover and report the names, towns, and telephone
numbers of its subscribers, but this data does not “ow[e] its
origin” to Rural. Rather, these bits of information are
uncopyrightable facts; they existed before Rural reported
them and would have continued to exist if Rural had never
published a telephone directory. 33
This is nonsense. To begin with, Rural did not “discover and
report the names, towns, and telephone numbers of its subscribers.”
It assigned telephone numbers to its subscribers, thereby creating the
“fact” that a particular telephone number was associated with a
particular subscriber. And Rural created new “facts” every time it
added a new subscriber, changed a subscriber’s telephone number,
or removed a former subscriber.
More importantly, the Court failed to define “facts” or provide a
coherent explanation of why they cannot be protected by copyright.
Presumably, by “facts” the Court meant something like “true

Id. at 347 (internal citations omitted) (citing NIMMER, supra note 28, §§ 2.11[A],
2.03[E], and then Burrow-Giles, 111 U. S. at 58).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 361 (1991) (internal citation omitted).
31
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statements about the world.”34 Yet, on that definition, at least some
of the listings copied by Feist were not “facts.” For example, Feist
copied four fake listings created by Rural in order to detect copying.
Were those fake listings “facts”? If not, were they protected by
copyright? Presumably, at least some of the listings copied by Feist
were inaccurate. Were those inaccurate listings “facts”? If not, were
they protected by copyright? What about telephone listings reported
in a fictional work?35
2.

The Idea-Expression Dichotomy

Luckily, the idea-expression dichotomy provides a coherent
explanation of why copyright cannot protect “facts.” The ideaexpression dichotomy provides that copyright can protect particular
expressions of an idea, but cannot protect the idea itself. It began as
a common law doctrine that Congress eventually codified. 36 As the
Copyright Act provides: “In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.” 37 For example, under the ideaexpression dichotomy, copyright cannot protect a bookkeeping
system because it is an idea, but it can protect an explanation of a
bookkeeping system because it is a particular expression of an idea. 38

See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43 (2007).
35 See, e.g., Id. (observing that “social facts” are generated by original expressions); Temin, supra note 6 (arguing that the listings were not “facts” at all, but “literary works”
independently created by Rural).
36 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
37 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2015).
38 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
34
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The so-called “merger doctrine” is essentially a gloss on the ideaexpression dichotomy. It provides that when an idea can only be
expressed in a limited number of ways, the idea and expression
“merge,” and copyright then cannot protect particular expressions of
that idea. 39 Essentially, the idea-expression dichotomy and the
merger doctrine express different versions of the principle that
copyright cannot protect abstractions, but can protect particular
expressions.
A fact is simply an idea that inherently can only be expressed in
a limited number of ways. As a consequence, copyright cannot
protect particular expressions of such ideas. For example, a telephone
listing expresses the idea: “name, address, telephone number.”
Accordingly, copyright cannot protect a telephone listing because it
is reduced to the very idea it expresses. The same is true of a fake or
inaccurate telephone listing. Likewise, a mathematical equation
expresses an idea. Copyright cannot protect a mathematical equation
because it reduces to the idea it expresses, whether or not that idea is
true. As Justin Hughes has observed, “[W]hen a distinguished judge
or scholar just says facts are not protected by copyright law, he or she
is engaged in a form of shorthand that is more than just imprecision.
It is a subconscious application of copyright’s merger doctrine.” 40
B. CREATIVITY
Second, the Court held that the compilation of white pages
listings copied by Feist also lacked “originality” because its creation
did not require any “creativity.” Specifically, the Court held that
copyright cannot protect “facts,” but can protect a “compilation of

Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble, 379 F. 2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F. 2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
40 Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 43, 56 (2007).
39
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facts,” so long as its ordering, selection, or arrangement of those facts
is both independently created and sufficiently creative:
Factual compilations, on the other hand, may possess the
requisite originality. The compilation author typically
chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them,
and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be
used effectively by readers. These choices as to selection and
arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the
compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are
sufficiently original that Congress may protect such
compilations through the copyright laws. 41
The Court explicitly recognized the tension between this
“creativity” requirement and its longstanding “aesthetic
nondiscrimination principle,” which provides that courts may not
consider the aesthetic value of a work of authorship when
determining whether it is protected by copyright. 42 The Court
adopted the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle in Bleistein v.
Donaldson, holding that copyright could protect posters used to
advertise a circus. As Justice Holmes observed:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
Id. at 359 (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52
(1903)). See generally Brian L. Frye, Aesthetic Nondiscrimination & Fair Use, 3 BELMONT
LAW REVIEW 29 (2016).
41
42
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learned the new language in which their author spoke. It
may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the
etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other
end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed
to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command
the interest of any public, they have a commercial value — it
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and
educational value — and the taste of any public is not to be
treated with contempt. It is an ultimate fact for the moment,
whatever may be our hopes for a change. That these pictures
had their worth and their success is sufficiently shown by the
desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs’
rights.43
Notably, no court has ever used the term “aesthetic
nondiscrimination.” Nevertheless, courts have universally adopted
Holmes’s minimalistic definition of originality, and the aesthetic
nondiscrimination principle has come to define the scope of
copyrightable subject matter.44 As Holmes explained:
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon
nature. Personality always contains something unique. It
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is
one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless
there is a restriction in the words of the act.45

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903).
See Diane Leenheer Zimmermann, It’s an Original! (?): In Pursuit of Copyright’s Elusive
Essence, 28 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 187, 204 (2005).
45 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250.
43
44
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In other words, copyright can protect any original expression, no
matter how banal or trivial. Or rather, as Brad Greenberg has
observed, copyright is like an Oprah giveaway: everybody gets one.46
The Court recognized this tension. Under the “aesthetic
nondiscrimination” doctrine, courts cannot consider the aesthetic
value of an element of a work of authorship in determining whether
it is protected by copyright, but under the “creativity” requirement,
courts must consider the aesthetic value of an element of a work of
authorship in order to determine whether it is “original” and thus
protected by copyright.
The Court tried to reconcile the “aesthetic nondiscrimination”
doctrine and the “creativity” requirement by holding that originality
requires only a “minimal” amount of “creativity.” 47 It noted that
even the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle articulated in Bleistein
explicitly excluded at least some works from copyright protection.48
And it tried to reconcile the tension between the aesthetic
nondiscrimination doctrine and the creativity requirement by
holding that originality requires vanishingly little “creativity”:
[T]he originality requirement is not particularly stringent. A
compiler may settle upon a selection or arrangement that
others have used; novelty is not required. Originality
requires only that the author make the selection or
arrangement independently (i.e., without copying that

Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright and Trademark Troll: Fable or Fact?, Panel Remarks
at Chapman University School of Law, Law Review Symposium (Jan. 30, 2015) (audio
recording 19:34–19:53), available at http://ibc.chapman.edu/Mediasite/Play/5fee
649a60414522a5a1c1627f222ff81d.
47 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358-59 (1991).
48 Id. (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits.”)).
46
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selection or arrangement from another work), and that it
display some minimal level of creativity. Presumably, the
vast majority of compilations will pass this test, but not all
will. There remains a narrow category of works in which the
creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually
nonexistent . . . .49
As mentioned, originality is not a stringent standard; it does
not require that facts be presented in an innovative or
surprising way. It is equally true, however, that the selection
and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine
as to require no creativity whatsoever. The standard of
originality is low, but it does exist. As this Court has
explained, the Constitution mandates some minimal degree
of creativity, and an author who claims infringement must
prove “the existence of . . . intellectual production, of
thought, and conception.”50
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that copyright could not
protect Rural’s white pages directory as a “compilation of facts”
because Rural’s selection, ordering, and arrangement of its white
pages listings lacked any creativity whatsoever.
The selection, coordination, and arrangement of Rural’s
white pages do not satisfy the minimum constitutional
standards for copyright protection. As mentioned at the
outset, Rural’s white pages are entirely typical. Persons
desiring telephone service in Rural’s service area fill out an
application and Rural issues them a telephone number. In
preparing its white pages, Rural simply takes the data

Id. at 358-59.
Id. at 362 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1884)).
49
50
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provided by its subscribers and lists it alphabetically by
surname. The end product is a garden-variety white pages
directory, devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity.
Rural’s selection of listings could not be more obvious: It
publishes the most basic information—name, town, and
telephone number—about each person who applies to it for
telephone service. This is “selection” of a sort, but it lacks the
modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection
into copyrightable expression. Rural expended sufficient
effort to make the white pages directory useful, but
insufficient creativity to make it original . . . .
Nor can Rural claim originality in its coordination and
arrangement of facts. The white pages do nothing more than
list Rural’s subscribers in alphabetical order. This
arrangement may, technically speaking, owe its origin to
Rural; no one disputes that Rural undertook the task of
alphabetizing the names itself. But there is nothing remotely
creative about arranging names alphabetically in a white
pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in
tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be
expected as a matter of course. It is not only unoriginal, it is
practically inevitable. This time-honored tradition does not
possess the minimal creative spark required by the
Copyright Act and the Constitution.51
We conclude that the names, towns, and telephone numbers
copied by Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were
not protected by the copyright in Rural’s combined white
and yellow pages directory. As a constitutional matter,

51

Id. at 362-64 (internal citations omitted).
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copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work
that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity.
Rural’s white pages, limited to basic subscriber information
and arranged alphabetically, fall short of the mark. As a
statutory matter, 17 U. S. C. § 101 does not afford protection
from copying to a collection of facts that are selected,
coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks
originality. Given that some works must fail, we cannot
imagine a more likely candidate. Indeed, were we to hold
that Rural’s white pages pass muster, it is hard to believe that
any collection of facts could fail.
Unfortunately, the Court failed to define “creativity,” or provide
any explanation of what “creativity” requires. As a consequence,
lower courts have struggled to apply the “creativity” requirement or
even to understand its purpose. 52 In practice, lower courts typically
recognize that “originality” requires both “independent creation”
and “creativity,” but ignore the “creativity” requirement. 53
This is entirely understandable since the “creativity”
requirement is irrelevant. 54 The Court adopted the “creativity”
requirement in order to address the facts before the Court and
explain why copyright cannot protect the selection, ordering, and
arrangement of the listings in a white pages telephone directory.
However, the Court could have achieved the same result by simply

See generally Temin, supra note 6; Omri Rachum-Twaig, Recreating Copyright: The Cognitive Process of Creation and Copyright Law, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 287 (2017).
53 See Karjala, supra note 26, at 186 (“After Feist was decided, it was predictable that
courts seeking to prevent market failures for ‘sweat of the brow’ works would broaden
their search for creativity in an effort to maintain the incentive to create works valued
by society, such as many maps and compilations that lack the stamp of authorial creativity on their face.”).
54 Cf. Temin, supra note 6,.
52
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applying the idea-expression dichotomy. As explained above, the
idea-expression dichotomy provides that copyright cannot protect
an individual telephone listing because there is only one way to
express the idea: name, address, telephone number. Furthermore, the
idea-expression dichotomy also provides that copyright cannot
protect the selection, ordering, and arrangement of the listings in a
white pages telephone directory for the same reason. The selection,
ordering, and arrangement of the listings in Rural’s white pages
telephone directory expressed the idea: Rural’s telephone subscribers
in alphabetical order. There is only one way to express this idea and
so it cannot be protected by copyright.
In the alternative, the Court could have held that copyright
cannot protect a white pages telephone directory as a compilation of
facts because the selection, ordering, and arrangement of those facts
is purely functional. 55 The Copyright Act excludes the functional
elements of a work of authorship from copyright protection. 56 The
selection, ordering, and arrangement of the listings in a white pages
telephone directory are not expressive in any way. They are instead
functional because they serve the purpose of enabling a user of the
directory to locate the desired listing.
In any case, the Court presumably intended the “creativity”
requirement to limit the scope of copyright protection by ensuring
that copyright cannot protect trivial or banal expressions. 57
Unfortunately, it accomplished exactly the opposite. The Court tried

See Karjala, supra note 26, at 179; Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439, 468-69, n.119 (2003)
56 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2015) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
57 See generally Zimmermann, supra note 44; see also Temin, supra note 6 (predicting that
Feist would cause market failures by preventing copyright protection of valuable factual works); Karjala, supra note 26, at 179 (predicting the same).
55
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to reconcile the “aesthetic nondiscrimination” doctrine and the
“creativity” requirement by requiring only a “minimal” amount of
“creativity.” But it set the “creativity” bar so low that essentially
anything but a white pages telephone directory qualifies as
“creative.” Indeed, even a yellow pages telephone directory is
sufficiently “creative” for copyright protection. The Court itself
suggested that copyright could protect not only Rural’s yellow pages
listings, but also some elements of Rural’s white pages listings that
Feist did not copy.58 Lower courts subsequently held that copyright
could protect an ethnic telephone directory and an automobile price
guide.59 If the Court intended the “creativity” requirement to limit
the scope of copyrightable subject matter, it failed miserably.
IV.

“CREATIVITY RHETORIC”

After Feist, the nature of copyrightable subject matter went from
purely descriptive to both descriptive and normative. Under the
aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine, a work of authorship simply
was or was not protected by copyright. Whether copyright protected
a work of authorship did not imply any normative judgment about
the value of the work. By contrast, under the “creativity”
requirement, a work of authorship implicitly either should or should
not be protected by copyright. Suddenly, copyrightable subject
matter acquired a subtle normative tinge. Yet since every work of
authorship is in practice protected by copyright, it follows every
work of authorship “should” be protected by copyright.

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (“Feist appears to concede that Rural's directory, considered as a whole, is subject to a valid copyright because it contains some foreword text, as well as original material in its yellow pages
advertisements. See Brief for Petitioner 18; Pet. for Cert. 9.”).
59 Key Publ’ns v. Chinatown Today Pub. Ent., 945 F. 2d 509 (2d. Cir. 1991); CCC Info.
Serv. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Rep., 44 F. 3d 61 (2d. Cir. 1994).
58
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While the “creativity” requirement itself is functionally
irrelevant, it encouraged the use of “creativity rhetoric,” which has
profoundly affected copyright doctrine. Under the aesthetic
nondiscrimination doctrine, original works of authorship received
copyright protection, irrespective of their aesthetic value.
Accordingly, copyright protection carried no implication of aesthetic
value. But under the “creativity” requirement, a work of authorship
is “original” and entitled to copyright protection if and only if it has
a “creative” element, no matter how trivial. As a result, copyright
protection does imply aesthetic value, even though the “creativity”
requirement does not actually require it.
“Creativity rhetoric” assumes that the purpose of copyright is to
promote creativity. This is readily apparent in both judicial opinions
and copyright scholarship.60 For example, many courts have opined
that the purpose of copyright is to promote creativity. 61 And many
scholars agree, although they disagree about whether it is successful.
Some argue that copyright reduces creativity by prohibiting copying

See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1151, 1151 (2007) ("Creativity is universally agreed to be a good that copyright
law should seek to promote"); Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking
Constitutional Indifference to Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 40
(2013) ("[I]n no uncertain terms the Court has articulated a view of copyright that defines the primary objective of copyright as creativity or originality (which turns on
creativity)."); Omri Rachum-Twaig, Recreating Copyright: The Cognitive Process of Creation and Copyright Law, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2776292 (stating that “copyright’s primary goal is to promote creativity”).
61 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (observing that exclusive intellectual property rights are “intended to encourage the creativity of ‘Authors and Inventors’”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating
that the “ultimate aim” of copyright law is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good”).
60
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and preventing productive re-use. 62 Others argue that it increases
creativity by discouraging copying and encouraging novelty. 63
Creativity rhetoric is broadly compatible with many theories of
copyright. Deontological theories of copyright can coherently
embrace creativity rhetoric, especially insofar as it argues that
copyright should protect aesthetically valuable works of authorship.
And at least some consequentialist theories of copyright can
coherently embrace creativity rhetoric, insofar as they argue that
promoting creativity will increase happiness or net welfare.
However, creativity rhetoric may be incompatible with the economic
theory of copyright.
V.

AGAINST CREATIVITY

The economic theory of copyright holds that copyright is
justified because it increases net economic welfare by solving market
and government failures in works of authorship. In other words,
under the economic theory, the purpose of copyright is to increase
the efficiency of the market for works of authorship by encouraging
marginal authors to satisfy consumer demand for works of
authorship.
By contrast, creativity rhetoric assumes that the purpose of
copyright is to promote “creativity,” which is typically associated

See, e.g., LARRY LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY TO LOCK
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004).
63 Fishman, supra note 5,. But see Dan L. Burk, The “Creating Around” Paradox, 128
HARV. L. REV. FORUM 118 (2015).
62
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with novelty. 64 “Creativity is the art of the new.” 65 For example,
Fishman argues that copyright promotes “creativity” by constraining
copying and encouraging novelty. 66 Likewise, Parchomovsky and
Stein argue that copyright should promote creativity by granting
more protection to novel works and less protection to generic works:
“The problem with the existing design is that by rewarding
minimally original works and highly original works alike, the law
incentivizes authors to produce works containing just enough
originality to receive protection—but not more.”67
There is no reason to assume that consumers demand
“creativity.” In fact, the market for works of authorship suggests the
opposite. 68 In general, consumers tend to prefer works that are
generic and familiar, and tend to reject works that are unusual and
unfamiliar. 69 For example, genre fiction is often popular, but

See, e.g., Creativity, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/creativity; Zimmermann, supra note 44, at 208 (“On the one hand, as
I noted earlier, Justice O'Connor wrote that she and her colleagues were not demanding novelty. In the next breath, however, she went on to explain that Rural's failure to
be original lay in the fact that it organized the names and telephone numbers of its
subscribers using a trite, “entirely typical” methodology. A problem of lack of novelty,
perhaps?”).
65 Madison, supra note 2, at 824.
66 Fishman, supra note 5.
67 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505 (2009). Notably,
Karjala suggests that is already the case. Karjala, supra note 26, at 178-79 (“[C]reativity
is often not merely a necessary condition for copyright protection, but for many courts
it is also a sufficient condition. Moreover, the scope of protection runs to the creativity
the court finds in the work.”). But see Simon Stern, Copyright, Originality, and the Public
Domain in Eighteenth-Century England, in ORIGINALITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH ENLIGHTENMENT 69-101 (Reginald McGinnis, ed., 2008).
68 See, e.g., Planet Money, Episode 288: Manufacturing The Song Of The Summer,
NATIONAL
PUBLIC
RADIO
(Jul.
10,
2015),
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/07/10/421874671/episode-288-manufacturing-the-song-of-thesummer (observing that hit songs are typically similar to but slightly different from
previous hit songs).
69 See Omri Rachum-Twaig, A Genre Theory of Copyright, 33 SANTA C LARA HIGH TECH.
L.J. 34 (2016).
64
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experimental fiction is rarely popular. 70 Pop music is often popular,
but experimental music is rarely popular. 71 Genre films are often
popular, but experimental films are rarely popular. 72 And so on.
While “creativity” may be aesthetically valuable, it is rarely popular;
and while banality may not be aesthetically valuable, it is often quite
popular. Of course, there are innumerable exceptions—many generic
and familiar works fail to sell while some unusual and unfamiliar
works are best-sellers. However, in general, the most popular works
are generic and familiar, while most unusual and unfamiliar works
are unpopular.
In other words, creativity rhetoric is inconsistent with the
economic theory of copyright. While creativity rhetoric assumes that
the purpose of copyright is to encourage creativity, the economic
theory of copyright assumes that the purpose of copyright is to solve
market failures in works of authorship demanded by consumers.
And it appears that creativity is negatively correlated with consumer
demand. For better or worse, consumers tend to favor familiar works
of authorship and disfavor creative ones.
This inconsistency suggests that copyright may cause market
failures, rather than solve them. For example, Fishman argues that
copyright encourages creativity by discouraging copying. 73 If he is
right, then copyright may discourage the production of works
consumers demand, and encourage the production of works they do
not. In other words, by increasing creativity, copyright may decrease

See New York Times' Bestsellers' List, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2017 available at https://
www.nytimes.com/books/best-sellers/ (last visited July 24, 2017).
71 See Billboard Hot 100, BILLBOARD, July 29, 2017 available at http://www.billboard.
com/charts/hot-100 (last visited July 24, 2017).
72 See Variety Box Office, VARIETY, http://variety.com/v/film/box-office/ (last
visited July 24, 2017).
73 Fishman, supra note 5.
70
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economic efficiency. Notably, authors can and do use licensing to
solve this government failure caused by creativity rhetoric, but they
are constrained by transaction costs. 74
Making matters worse, creativity rhetoric further decreases the
efficiency of copyright law by inducing courts to narrow the scope of
the fair use doctrine. In theory, the creativity requirement limits
copyrightable subject matter, and transformativeness limits the fair
use doctrine. In practice, the creativity requirement is irrelevant
because the aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine prevents courts
from considering the aesthetic value of a work of authorship. But the
aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine doesn’t apply to fair use. When
a court considers a fair use defense, it must determine whether the
use is transformative, which necessarily requires the court to
consider the aesthetic value of the use. This double standard
discriminates in favor of copyright owners and against users.75
Creativity rhetoric exacerbates the problem by encouraging
copyright normativity. The economic theory of copyright is purely
consequentialist. It holds that copyright is justified when it increases
net economic welfare and unjustified when it does not. But creativity
rhetoric is profoundly normative. It suggests that copyright owners
deserve to own a copyright in their works of authorship because they
are creative. And it suggests that fair use is justified only if the use is
sufficiently creative to outweigh the copyright owner’s moral rights.
In other words, creativity rhetoric encourages courts to adopt a
jaundiced view of fair use, in which copyright claims are
presumptively valid, and fair use claims are presumptively invalid.
Under the economic theory, the only relevant question should be
whether allowing the use would increase or decrease net economic
welfare.

74
75

See Burk, supra note 63.
Brian L. Frye, Aesthetic Nondiscrimination & Fair Use, 3 BELMONT L. REV. 29 (2016)
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Ironically, while copyright probably does solve some market and
government failures in works of authorship, it is ill-suited to
promoting creativity. The economic theory of copyright assumes that
authors are rational economic actors who want to satisfy consumer
demand for works of authorship. To the extent that is true, it
probably increases the efficiency of the market for works of
authorship. For example, marginal corporate authors are unlikely to
invest in the production of certain works of authorship if they cannot
prevent free riding. Rational economic actors invest in the
production of works of authorship only if they expect to earn a profit.
But they also invest in the production of works of authorship that
consumers demand, i.e., familiar works of authorship.
By contrast, copyright rarely provides salient incentives to
authors interested in producing genuinely creative works of
authorship. 76 While creative authors may respond to certain
economic incentives, they rarely respond to copyright incentives.
Recall, the more “creative” a work of authorship, the lower its typical
economic value. If anything, copyright encourages marginal authors
to invest in the production of less “creative,” more generic works of
authorship, assuming they are rational economic actors.
Copyright is largely irrelevant to most marginal authors
interested in producing “creative” works. For example, fine artists
are among the most “creative” authors. But as Amy Adler has
observed, copyright is largely irrelevant to fine artists. 77 If anything,
they welcome reproduction, as the art market depends on scarcity,
not reproduction.78 Moreover, their “creativity” effectively becomes
a form of trademark or trade dress. The same is true of avant-garde

See generally JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH (2014).
Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, N.Y.U. L. REV. (2016).
78 Cf. WALTER BENJAMIN, THE WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL
REPRODUCTION (1936).
76
77
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writers and musicians. Effectively, they sell their “creativity” as a
distinct brand, rather than selling copies of their works of authorship.
Relying on copyright to encourage creativity is highly inefficient,
because it imposes a high economic cost and provides only a low
social benefit. Copyright increases the cost of generic and familiar
works of authorship by providing broader and longer rights than are
necessary to provide salient incentives to marginal authors, and it
does not provide a salient incentive to the most creative authors, who
respond to very different market signals.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of the “creativity” requirement and the rise of
“creativity rhetoric” are unfortunate developments in copyright
doctrine and scholarship because they are a distraction from the
purpose of copyright, which is to increase net economic welfare.
Copyright should ignore “creativity” and instead focus on economic
value.

